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Fitting Standard Software Packages to Non-Standard Organisations: 
The ‘Biography’ of an Enterprise-Wide System 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the development and implementation of a generic off-the-shelf computer 
package and the competing pressures for standardisation and differentiation as this package is 
made to fit new organisational settings. The particular focus is on an Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system and its application within universities. In order for the ERP system to fit 
this setting a new module called ‘Campus’ is being developed. We followed the module as the 
current ‘generic user’ embodied in the software was translated to a more ‘specific user’ (a 
number of universities piloting the module) and back once again to a generic form of university 
user (the potential ‘global university marketplace’). We develop the notion that these systems 
have a ‘biography’, which helps us to analyse the evolution of software along its life cycle and 
provides insights into the different dynamics at play as Campus is translated for use in a number 
of institutions and countries. The study draws on over three years of ethnographic research 
conducted in a British University and a major ERP Supplier.  
INTRODUCTION 
After more than 30 years of software development for an ever-growing variety of institutional 
and organisational settings, few large-scale information systems are developed completely from 
scratch. Rather, most software applications are constructed by adapting existing ‘packages’ to 
new organisational contexts and settings. The category of systems that we are concerned with 
here -  integrated enterprise-wide software solutions - are part of the software market that is 
bounded from 'below' (closer to the computer) by the market for operating systems, 
programming tools, and utilities and from 'above' (closer to the user) by end-user applications 
such as desktop productivity solutions and multimedia software. Despite their rapid diffusion 
across the widest range of sectors, however, it is increasingly evident that enterprise systems 
remain a costly and high-risk strategy. While suppliers aim to extend their solutions into as many 
different settings as possible, these systems do not translate easily across boundaries, whether 
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between organisations within the same sector, between industrial sectors or between public and 
private sector organisational forms. Some of the consequences for those wishing to capitalise on 
the benefits of packages is that they often undergo unwanted organisational change in adapting 
practices to models of work and organisational process embedded in the software. These 
dilemmas are particularly acute with integrated solutions (such as Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) systems, the focus of this article) which seek new kinds of organisational flexibility and 
performance by capturing and integrating the full range of activities and transactions across an 
organisation. Despite a growing literature on the uptake of enterprise-wide systems very little is 
known about how the gulf between standardised solutions and the specific contexts, practices 
and requirements of adopting organisations is reconciled both within user and supplier 
organisations. In the first part of the article we focus on what might be seen as an extreme 
example of the gulf, the application of ERP packages in universities. We discuss the various 
incommensurabilities that arise as a system is rolled out and adapted for use in one particular 
institution (a university we are calling ‘Big Civic’).  
More generally, as concerns rise concerning the incommensurability of systems and contexts, 
there are demands for solutions that are already partially adapted to particular business settings 
(i.e., ‘semi-generic’ packages) and for increased user-involvement in the shaping of packages1. 
Alongside the adoption of these systems, then, there is an equally important story of innovation 
within supplier organisations and collaboration with package adopter as the technologies are 
adapted to these new contexts. In the second part we analyse the development of new ERP 
functionality, a university specific module called ‘Campus’, which is being built to facilitate the 
take-up of ERP by universities. The module is being designed around the needs of Big Civic and 
a number of other ‘pilot sites’ around the world and the eventual plan is to market Campus as a 
‘global university product’. We develop the notion that software packages have a ‘biography’, 
which helps us analyse the evolution of the software along its life cycle and provides us with 
insights into the different dynamics at play as Campus is translated for use in a number of 
institutions and countries. 
THE ‘BIOGRAPHY’ OF AN ERP SYSTEM 
ERP systems have become over a relatively short space of time key organisational technologies 
and suppliers have been highly successful in both creating and meeting this demand2. How can 
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we begin to explain the success of these systems? We identify two important aspects, only the 
latter of which has been the subject of much detailed research. These are the related processes of  
‘genericification’ and standardisation that surround and accompany ERP systems. By 
genericification we point to the supplier strategy of taking a technology that has worked in one 
place and attempting to make it work elsewhere, and, in principle, ‘everywhere’. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the software package we have studied, for example, was initially 
conceived for and used by manufacturing firms before being applied within non-manufacturing 
settings (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, retail, banking etc) and, more recently, non-commercial 
contexts (heath care, public sector, higher education and so on). Today, ERP systems are so 
widely diffused that they now commonly described as the de facto standard for the replacement 
of legacy systems in medium and large sized organisations, and it said that some companies find 
it impossible to work ‘without one’3. The transferability of this software is possible because 
unlike conventional software development, packages are designed for a market and not a specific 
customer. Just how software is designed in this way is the subject of this paper and a theme to 
which we shall return.  
In order for suppliers to reap the benefits of scale these systems must function in new settings in 
much the same way as they have functioned in all other settings. Several studies have considered 
the ‘impact’ such solutions have on organisations and how organisations often undergo 
expensive (and unwanted) organisational change and standardisation in adapting organisational 
practices to process models embedded in the software, a topic about which much has been 
written. Davenport, for example, to quote the most cited author, discusses the case of a company 
with a well established practice of giving its largest and most important customers preferential 
treatment, such as sending them products originally assigned to other customers. Once the new 
system was adopted, however, this was no longer possible as such a practice was proscribed by 
the technology4. The benefits of this strategy for suppliers are that they have to cater for only 
limited amounts of variation in product maintenance and new upgrades; for user organisations 
the benefits are having simple and guaranteed upgrade pathways. The downsides for suppliers 
are foregoing the high value-added markets for customised solutions; for user organisations the 
downsides stem from risk inherent in packages not adequately matching their requirements. It 
appears that in the conflict of interests, the supplier viewpoint generally holds sway: while 
marketing their systems as ‘entirely flexible’ and capable of coping with such idiosyncrasies, 
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many suppliers actively encourage adopters to limit their attempts to tailor or modify the 
software by releasing upgrades and new software that are compatible only with the ‘standard 
system’. According to a recent study of the German software house SAP, this proscription is not 
only limited to such direct methods but also permeates the whole ERP domain and its 
community of users. The systems embeds established ways of being used, as well as how the 
implementation is organised, all of which is reinforced textually through user documentation, by 
visits to other reference sites, and through the ‘…experience, competence and practices 
established in and shared by the SAP ‘development community’’5. There is, as one would expect 
however, no consensus about just how much (or little) customisation can be carried out. 
Davenport also discusses the case of Visio, a small software company with unusual methods for 
accounting for its revenues and inventory, and how both these ‘…idiosyncrasies could be 
accommodated, but only with substantial extra programming’6. Light similarly points out that 
some organisations cannot completely adopt the standard model and therefore have no choice but 
to attempt customisation7. Other, more ethnographic based research has attempted to similarly 
emphasise how these technologies are typically ‘localised’ by adopters. Wagner & Scott in their 
study of a US university describe how the standard templates in the ERP package were 
‘compromised’ through ‘skirmishes’ and user resistance and this allowed the emergence of a 
much more ‘local information system’8.  
One body of literature, then, tends to emphasise how most adopters end up fitting their 
organisation to the system (rather than the other way around), while another pays particular 
attention to the ‘workarounds’ and other strategies users deploy to adapt the technology to the 
specific setting9. A final strand has sought to reconcile these positions through emphasising how 
technology and organisation are often brought into alignment through a combination of quite 
complicated organisational change and software configuration, a process which is sometimes 
known as ‘mutual adaptation’10. In general, ERP tends to be portrayed in the literature in one of 
two ways: either as potent ‘global’ technologies likely to transform all before them or as systems 
that work only because they are entirely ‘domesticated’ by their users. It is as if for some the 
universal applicability of ERP is beyond question, and for others there is no technology or 
standard able to work across many sites. Even those studies that have considered packages in 
terms of mutual adaptation tend to emphasise one side or the other11. While highlighting 
important issues, we argue that the theory and policies of computer system adoption and 
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implementation have failed to keep pace with the challenges and dilemmas raised by the 
widespread diffusion of standardised software packages. We see a number of problems. First, 
much of the research is based on ‘snapshots’ that emphasise only single phases or aspects of the 
software package life-cycle (such as implementation) and there is no attempt to follow software 
as it evolves, matures or crosses organisational boundaries. In this respect, we suggest focusing 
on the ‘biography’ of these technologies (see below). Second, where there has been research on 
package suppliers this has centred on labour process and organisational issues, such as the 
occupational hierarchies developing between those who design packages and those who 
implement them12, the contrasting working cultures of package and bespoke system designers13, 
and the difficulties of co-ordinating packaged software teams who are seldom co-located and 
distant from those who will eventually use their systems14. There has been little focus on how 
suppliers of packages manage the tension between designing system for a specific user and for a 
wider market. ERP suppliers have incentives to build systems that can be applied in the widest 
range of settings, for instance, and, therefore, design software with general or ‘ideal types’ of 
businesses in mind, even though no such form of organisation actually exists. How does this 
process of genericification occur?  
Third, there has been little focus on the relationship between supplier and user organisations, and 
very little is known about how package suppliers actually interact with or get to know about their 
users, for instance15. In terms of the former, it is assumed that there is little interaction between 
these two groups other than that brought about through initial procurement activity16. Even 
during the process of implementation when there are possibilities of interaction it is generally 
accepted that it is user organisations and not suppliers who are responsible for the configuration 
of the package and its rollout within the organisation17. In terms of the latter, there are thought to 
be two different approaches for how suppliers understand user groups. One entails finding a 
representative organisation and developing a version of the system based on this organisation. 
The next step is to redesign or make the system more generic by identifying those ‘universal’ 
aspects of the system whilst coding out specific user features, a process that is said to be 
extremely difficult or even in some cases ‘impossible’18. An alternative, and more popular 
approach is to base basic understandings of the user group on ‘text book’ models of the 
application area rather than on interactions with user organisations, as was typified by the 
development of packages like Computer Aided Production Management (CAPM)19. This is 
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because suppliers wish to avoid affiliating their package with any one group of organisations for 
fear that it will become too specialised (and therefore not marketable as a generic package).  
We suggest an approach that focuses on the ‘biography’ of software packages. Building on work 
from within material culture20, we attempt to trace the ‘accumulated history’ of a software 
packages and show how it continues to influence the structures and practices of later adopters. In 
particular, the notion emphasises the way artefacts move around (across national borders or the 
boundaries of several industrial sectors) and are adapted and redefined according to the needs of 
each new setting. The approach also highlights the various relationships and meanings an artefact 
that is established among one community may have for actors and communities in other settings. 
This perspective has obvious sympathies with Social Worlds Theory, which has discussed how 
distinct communities interpret and put ‘boundary objects’ to use21. It also parallels writing from 
Actor Network Theory, where not only humans but also artefacts and technologies are treated as 
actors with ‘histories’22.  
We also explore how end-users shape and exploit software through customisation and other 
strategies and how their organisational specificities influence the evolution of the software. In 
this respect the notion of biography shares some characteristics with Bruno Latour’s notion of 
chains of transformation, where changes to the technology might be seen as actors leaving 
behind, and the selective carrying forward, of certain aspects of the system biography23. It also 
draws on the developing ‘Social Learning’ perspective that has described the processes by which 
computer systems are integrated into existing organisational practices24. Two inter-
linked processes in the diffusion of technical artefacts into organizations are identified within 
this approach. ‘Domestication’, which is the process whereby user organizations accommodate 
new technical artefacts through a process of ‘learning by doing’25 and ‘innofusion’, which is the 
process of transformation that an artefact undergoes as it diffuses into an organisation26. These 
complementary dynamics emphasise the intense innovation processes involved in the ‘struggle’ 
to implement an artefact and get it to work under particular social and technical exigencies; and 
the more protracted process of ‘design in use’ where the system is transformed to match the 
changing organization around it. Importantly, this perspective specifically highlights the need to 
feed implementation experience back to future technological supply27.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The first author conducted ethnographic research over a three-year period. The study was 
carried out at ‘Big Civic’, a large red-brick university in the North of England and at a 
large ERP supplier. Prior to the introduction of Campus we had also followed the 
implementation of a number of other ERP modules at Big Civic. In line with our aim to 
focus on the biography of such packages we include and build on insights from this earlier 
work28. An ethnographic study suggests a long-term involvement in a particular field site, 
during which time a variety of methods are deployed to understand and participate in the 
relationships and activities ongoing in that setting. The aim of this activity is to say 
something about the various, often tacit, ways in which the subjects of the ethnography 
organise their lives. In terms of ‘what’ and ‘who’ we decided to look at we drew lessons 
from the sociology of science and technology and the actor network tradition. In terms of 
what should be studied, Latour has famously advocated that technologies should be studied 
not as finished artefacts (i.e., black boxes) but ‘in the making’, arguing that, by studying 
them in this way, the ‘messiness’ is still there for all to see29. By messiness he means not 
only those issues identified by the researcher but those that arise during the building and 
implementation of ICT projects. We studied, therefore, projects as they were actually being 
planned, built, and used. During both phases of the research we employed a wide range of 
qualitative methods, which included direct and participative observation of ‘strategy’ and 
technical meetings and user testing sessions.  
Within Big Civic, we observed the weekly ‘Sponsors Group’ meetings where day-to-day 
technical and organisational decisions were made. The monthly ‘Strategy Group’ meetings 
were observed where issues more relevant to the future direction of the university were the 
focus. Project away days, comprising mainly those technical and administrative staff 
involved in the actual implementation of the project were also attended. Within the ERP 
supplier one of Campus’s testing sessions was observed, where technical teams and ‘end-
users’ from the various pilot and early adopter sites gathered together to provide input and 
help shape the software. During this session, and at a subsequent ‘Campus User Group’ 
workshop, we also met and talked with programmers and analysts from the technology 
supplier as well as staff from the other participating universities. We were also able to 
conduct a number of individual and group-based semi-structured interviews, as well as 
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more informal discussions with members of the Big Civic technical team and user 
community. Finally, supporting material, such as meeting notes, email exchanges and 
reports were also collected and analysed.  
BACKGROUND 
Until recently, universities like many other large organisations relied on computer systems that 
had been developed ‘in-house’ and that had grown over time in an ad-hoc manner. These 
systems were typically maintained by dedicated university staff who, as the need arose, would 
develop new software or as was increasingly happening ‘bolt on’ commercial packages to meet 
changing institutional requirements30. While there had been little research done on the actual 
usability and effectiveness of these early systems, there were numerous complaints about the 
quality of management information that these systems provided, particularly that which was 
reported upwards to Government31. The ‘MAC’ initiative, which was a bespoke management 
information system developed during the early 1990s, was an attempt to remedy this through 
standardising the way in which information was collected and reported.  Widely adopted, these 
systems were largely acknowledged as ‘unsuccessful’ as many institutions quickly looked to 
replace them with alternative solutions32.  
Big Civic, who were not keen to repeat their MAC experience, decided to procure a generic of-
the-shelf system and thus invited a number of well-known enterprise-wide system providers to 
tender for the project. From the potential bidders, a large European supplier was selected; one of 
the reasons for this choice was that it was the most high profile of the suppliers around, their 
product having established itself as the market leader. Another (rather counter intuitive) reason 
was that the system was known to be highly ‘prescriptive’ with the integration of its various 
‘modules’ (HR, Finance, Logistics etc) demanding a simultaneous wide-scale business process 
change. This met with similar plans developing at Big Civic for organisational restructuring (see 
below). Finally, and perhaps more importantly, while the supplier had little experience of 
working in a higher education settings it had demonstrated an intention to commit resources to 
re-developing its software for this new market.  
The actual work of building Campus began shortly after the decision to implement the larger 
ERP system. The University’s status in this project was as one of several ‘pilot sites’ or, as they 
were some times referred to, ‘development partners’. This difference in nomenclature suggests 
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more engagement than one might normally expect from a pilot site (the nature of this 
engagement and the extent to which the Supplier is able to manage the full participation of 
several development partners is a theme we return to in the paper). Right from the beginning, Big 
Civic was particularly active in the project, and encouraged by the Supplier, established a 
dedicated ‘student management system team’ (‘the team’) comprising experts on student 
administration as well computer systems. Many of this team had been (or still were) involved in 
the wider ERP implementation and so had some understanding of the nature of the work ahead. 
From Big Civic’s point of view the whole project appeared to be a unique opportunity to have all 
the benefits of a standard software package without many of the problems (i.e., the system could 
shaped according to their specific needs). From the Supplier’s point of view it was a good 
opportunity to have a British university involved which they might use as a ‘flagship reference 
site’ to encourage other institutions to adopt their ERP solution (internal report, April 2000).  
More generally, throughout Big Civic there appeared to be initially a good level of support for 
Campus and the deal the University had managed to broker. As part of the partnership, for 
instance, it was agreed that the Supplier would meet all the software costs as well as some of the 
implementation costs. On the project website, it was described as a ‘pioneering’ development 
between a well-respected software supplier and several prestigious universities from around the 
world with which Big Civic was at the forefront. The plan was eventually to merge Campus with 
the other ERP modules already installed, meaning that not only would Big Civic be among the 
first to rollout the Campus module but also it would be the first in the world to have a fully 
integrated ‘University ERP solution’. 
THE GENISIS OF CAMPUS  
As we have said, the package investigated in this study was understood to be among the most 
rigid of ERP systems on the market, carrying both prescriptive and proscriptive assumptions 
about the nature of work and organisational process. Studies have shown us that systems with 
such a mature or well-defined biography do not travel particularly well33. Below, we describe 
how the new Campus module develops out of, and attempts to carry forward, this biography. The 
Supplier was aware of possible transferability problems and planned from the outset to commit 
significant resources to re-developing its software for this new market. This included tailoring 
existing modules to meet new requirements and, where there was seen to be a lack of 
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functionality, the development of the new Campus module. However, before embarking on a 
full-scale development project, it appeared to the Supplier that there was the possibility of re-
using existing software whilst building Campus. For example, the Training & Events 
Management module and the Real Estate module, both of which were designed around the needs 
of commercial organisations, appeared to offer the kind of functionality demanded by 
universities. However, even after much adaptation work these systems did not translate as easily 
into their intended setting as has been anticipated. For example, an email from a Belgian 
University, one of the ‘pilot sites’ involved with Big Civic in the development of the Campus 
module, describes some of the limitations of re-using the existing software:  
Until now the Real Estate module has always been referred to for student housing. This only 
contains the functionality to ‘let’ rooms (very commercial). For some universities this is not 
enough. Student rooms are often part of student aid. A lot of extra activities have to be 
organised in association with this (e.g. meals). 
There were also complaints from many across Big Civic: 
…the Real Estate Module is so far removed from our requirements that [the Supplier] would 
do better to start again from scratch than try to adjust the existing module. The most obvious 
shortcomings of ‘Real Estate’ for us is that the module is designed for the commercial sector 
where long term lets of 12 months or more are standard. It is not designed for the levels of 
volume and turnover that characterise the student market and, even more obviously, the 
conference market. In short, Real Estate does not set out to be a retail booking system, which 
is what we are looking for (internal memo from the Estates Department). 
One problem concerned the incommensurabilities between the roles and responsibilities of actors 
embodied in the system and those within Big Civic. ERP systems are structured around general 
notions such as ‘supplier’, ‘customer’ and ‘employee’ and while these may share some of the 
characteristics of actors found in universities, they do not map straightforwardly. None of these 
categories appeared to fit with the notion of a student, for example. In the Real Estate module, 
therefore, which was being adapted for the management of accommodation on campus, the 
student had to be in effect conceived of as a special type of employee, one who was undertaking 
a long-term training course and thus permanently renting a room. Unsuprisingly, this raised 
tensions among those with responsibilities towards student administration who found that they 
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could not account for many of the circumstances and characteristics of the students they 
routinely dealt with. Indeed, some months later the Supplier would admit to Big Civic and the 
other pilots how re-using software was not appropriate in the case of universities, nor would it be 
possible to simply move the universities towards the organisational assumptions embodied in the 
software. One member of the Big Civic team describes the issue rather elegantly: 
Part of our problem in the beginning, with them and with other consultants, [was that] we 
didn’t want to go through the ‘sausage machine’ and they kept trying to push us through and 
it took a long time for them to realise that we wouldn’t go… (interview, 09/2000). 
LOCALISATION THROUGH STANDARDISATION  
The biography approach draws attention to how these technologies are always in a constant 
process of transformation and translation. Suppliers will attempt to reconcile the gulf between 
their solutions and the specific contexts of adopters in a number of interesting ways. One method 
is to localise the system (not to the many idiosyncratic practices of the adopters) but to ‘common 
processes’ throughout the University. Below, we discuss how at Big Civic and the other pilots no 
such processes existed and thus had to be created. Under pressure the Supplier set about a major 
software writing effort in order to move the Campus module from the typical or ‘generic’ ERP 
user to a more specific university user. The actual work of adapting and expanding the software 
to the new context of the university was organised as a complex chain linking Big Civic, the 
other pilot implementation sites, with analysts and programmers (who were adapting the 
software). Individual requests for changes to the system (for example, the addition of new 
functionality) were passed along the chain. In this adaptation work, information about existing 
management and administration processes would, theoretically at least, be collected and passed 
back down the chain to the programmers, who would pass back code based on their 
understanding of the information they had received. In practice, however, the analysts and 
programmers often received incomplete or ambiguous responses to the questions they were 
asking. One issue that the Supplier continually came up against was that there was no university 
there to fit to the system34.  
By this we mean that for some functions of the university there are no clearly articulated 
institution-wide policies or standards, with individual departments often working according to 
their own informal practices – a situation that is typical of what Ian McNay describes as the 
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classic ‘collegial academy’35. For example, in one meeting conducted on the Supplier’s premises 
and attended by Big Civic and a number of other pilots, there was a session where institutions 
were asked to clarify and explain their policies for student registration. What emerged was that 
there was a diversity of processes for carrying the same task within each institution. “We have 3 
different ways of handling credit points”, (Large Campus University). Moreover, some activities 
were clouded as to who did what and when: “What I can determine is that you don’t have a clear 
cut process, it is informal” (Supplier Analyst summarising one particular conversation). Others 
activities appeared to be so complicated as to be shrouded in mystery – when asked to explain 
how their university assigned students to particular faculties and departments, for instance, a 
Large Campus University representative somewhat ironically described how: “It is magic. I 
don’t know how to clearly explain our situation”. 
Within Big Civic there were similar problems. We observed, for instance, how the 
implementation team attempted to uncover the recent history of practices regarding the handling 
of Student Fees so that they might be explained to the Supplier and included in the module. In 
one conversation, the team is trying to work out the process for setting and administering ‘fee 
categories’, which were categories that had been established on the existing MAC system. It was 
not obvious, however, why the categories were there or who had decided which course was 
applied to which category: 
Every degree programme is currently assigned to a fee category within MAC. However, the 
process by which new programmes are allocated to categories is unclear and haphazard. The 
fee category is an important parameter in the new system… (Internal document) 
Further investigations provided no clues and, thus, the team concluded that the staff responsible 
for inputting fee categories was just simply ‘making them up’.  
As a result, the actual means by which the module was localised for use in Big Civic represented 
something of a ‘bootstrapping problem’36. Fitting the Campus module to the University meant 
first drawing upon institutional-wide rules and procedures. These as we have described were not 
always available. Designing new sets of common institutional standards (such as a fees policy) 
that Campus might draw upon was further complicated, moreover. The team did not as yet have 
the module to guide or direct them in drawing up new policies and standards and thus found it 
difficult to set out and plan institution-wide processes while the system was not available. At the 
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same time, the Supplier was unable to fully localise the system until this process of 
standardisation had been carried out. In many cases both parties had to ‘imagine’ how the other 
might work37.  
BUILDING A GLOBAL PRODUCT 
Reconciling this gulf between the generic model and the specific mode of use required by Big 
Civic was not the only barrier to the implementation of the module. Other problems originate 
from the Supplier’s intentions to market the module around the world as a potential ‘global 
product’. Consider the following extract:  
Campus is intended to be a global product. In order to facilitate this, the software is being 
designed to be as flexible as possible to allow individual universities to configure the 
functionality according to their own processes. Because the basic design has to accommodate 
university structures and processes across many countries, much of the functionality can be 
configured in more than one way and the overall functionality is likely to be much wider 
than that required for any one country (Big Civic internal report).   
The module therefore was to include the ‘local standards’ of all of the participating sites and 
where specific features could not be included each site would carry out their own individual 
customisation work. In other words, the Supplier was not only attempting to move the module 
from a generic user to a specific user, but it was attempting to move it back again to a more 
general form of ‘university user’. Interestingly, one of the methods used by the Supplier to do 
this was to invite the pilots and other ‘early adopters’ to regular testing sessions of the module. 
One of the authors observed one such meeting, where the aim was to find where there might be 
some common requirements among universities, and if not how these might be constructed.  
Constructing General University Users 
One method of arriving at common needs was through the development of what the Supplier 
called ‘generalisable concepts’. These appeared to concepts that were sufficiently flexible to be 
able to work across multiple sites but were also not so weakly structured as to lose their shared 
identity. Below, we discuss an attempt to construct one such concept for the practice of 
‘holding’. Holding is the process by which a student might be blocked on the system from re-
registering for a new academic term because of outstanding debts to the university (tuition fees, 
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unpaid rent, library fines etc) or through failing an exam or coursework. The issue being 
discussed below is whether holds should be input manually by administration staff or whether 
they should be automatically triggered by Campus. According to the Supplier manual inputs are 
a ‘system limitation’ and if the pilots could only arrive at a common set of understandings about 
the holding process, then the procedure could be automated. In the meeting, one analyst asks for 
comments on what currently happens at each institution: 
Supplier Analyst: Students with bad marks. What do you do with them, leave them in limbo 
or give them a second chance? 
Southern University: Depends on timing, if just before a session and there is no chance of 
them bettering their mark, then we refuse them. Or, alternatively, we could say we’ve not 
decided yet. That is not a hold but a ‘waiting status’. 
Technology University: If you’re doing something that might pick up your grades? 
Supplier Analyst: I wouldn’t call that a hold, that’s a ‘provisional situation’.  
Rural University: We have a ‘partial hold’, so holds affects some things… 
Large Campus University: Isn’t that a ‘half-hold’… 
The discussion goes on for some time and finally everyone (including the analyst) appears to be 
in a state of confusion as to what a hold might be (a ‘waiting status’, a ‘provisional situation’, ‘a 
half hold…’)38. Reaching common understandings and developing generalisable concepts is far 
from straightforward. Interestingly, it is the Supplier and not the universities who were keen to 
have these discussions. For them, such a process is useful as it allows the construction of a robust 
concept and thus one that is applicable to the widest variety of higher education institutions. In 
contrast, the participants at the testing session were becoming increasingly frustrated by the 
attempts to understand each and every difference among the universities present. 
INCORPORATING SPECIFIC CONTEXTS 
In these initial stages of Campus’s biography the module was all-inclusive as the aim was to 
build a generic package for use across many types of higher education institutions and not 
around the specific needs of any one adopter. However, some time later, it appeared that in order 
to produce a working solution that there was a need to build a specific and local context into the 
software39. It was widely thought, for instance, among those participating in the pilot project that 
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Big Civic and ‘Large Campus’, an American University also participating as a pilot site, had 
been particularly successful in ensuring that many of their features were included in the software. 
This was apparently because they were to be the first to ‘go live’ with the module. A Big Civic 
internal report describes how: 
Although [the Supplier] is aiming to build Campus with a ‘global common core’ to the 
software, [Big Civic] has been able to influence the content of that global core product to its 
benefits, along with the UK specific requirements. This should ensure that the amount of 
‘customer specific’ development and configuration is kept to an absolute minimum.   
However, towards the latter stages of the project, Big Civic found that though it had been able to 
shape the content of the module to its benefit that it too was beginning to lose its influence in 
light of pressure from Large Campus. The Supplier it seemed had problems coping with wide-
ranging and sometimes diverging needs of the pilot sites:  
[The Supplier] has problems: too many requests from the pilots, together with [Large 
Campus’s] demands for changes, means that they have more demands than resources and are 
trying to prune down on what they need to give to us go live with (Big Civic Project Director 
speaking at an Away-day).  
Part of the problem as the Project Director saw it was that the Supplier did not yet have a clear 
vision of a general university user: “There are lots of people from around the world asking for 
different things and because they don’t have a model of university to work with, they can’t 
decide on what is important” (our emphasis). Moreover, the Supplier was finding it increasingly 
difficult to continue to resource the production of generalisable concepts, particularly when 
many appeared to work across a few sites only. Therefore, the universities were drawn into a 
struggle with the Supplier and with one another over the inclusion of their specific needs. This as 
described by the Project Director at Big Civic led to a ‘push and shove’ between them and Large 
Campus.   
Campus Takes Shape 
The nature of the struggle between Big Civic and Large Campus University was over the scope 
of Campus. The American University was pushing the Supplier to include functionality to cope 
with differing forms of student enrolment and registration. They argued that the inclusion of 
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advanced features such as ‘self-service’ functionality and links to Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) software would suit their more ‘market oriented’ admission process. The 
Project Director at Big Civic, however, saw this as having implications for their student 
management processes:   
Rather than a UCAS [University Centralised Admissions System] type system, [Large 
Campus] has a competitive marketplace and therefore wants online student registration. [The 
Supplier] has finite support and [Large Campus’s] needs is more complicated than 
ours…[Large Campus] also plonked on the table more requests for CRM and that has blown 
the whole thing apart. If [the Supplier] meets this request, then that is less for us (Notes from 
an away-day meeting) 
His concerns were that the module was about to take a direction that would not be workable in 
the context of Big Civic. Although initially open to the possibility, and team members from Big 
Civic had been among those asking for the inclusion of such functionality, colleagues in the 
Central Administration and throughout the wider University were less convinced that self-service 
registration or CRM was desirable in their context40. On top of this, much of the new technology 
(like CRM) appeared to be at odds with their more ‘handicraft’ and ‘paper based’ approach to the 
registration and management of students on campus. As both sets of needs could not be 
reconciled within Campus the supplier had to prioritise one set of requirements over another; 
choosing as some internal critics have described to build the system according to the needs of the 
larger US market. 
Accommodating Unwanted Functionality 
It has been suggested that computer systems which become so ‘thoroughly imbued’ with local 
idiosyncrasies can only work at one site41. While suppliers of packages are careful to ensure that 
a package does not fully mirror the needs of one particular adopter, there are times when 
adopters have to accommodate the specific requirement of an earlier adopter into their own 
organisations. These accommodations provide for interesting tensions and are worth exploring. 
In order to implement Campus, Big Civic had to live with features that were at odds with its own 
requirements. One example, and there were many others of this kind, was the part of the system 
used to record applications by prospective students. This was built according to procedures 
common within American universities, and as applicants there are required to submit 
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‘application fees’, the system automatically generates an ‘accounting record’ for each new 
prospective student so that the appropriate information can be logged. There is no similar fee 
requirement in Britain therefore leaving Big Civic with the problem of deciding what to do with 
all the unwanted accounting record, some 30,000 being generated each academic year.  
Indeed, the presence of so much unwanted functionality presented something of a paradox for 
Big Civic. On one hand, it was important that inappropriate aspects of the system were modified 
to ease concerns of prospective users who were already questioning the suitability of Campus 
and departmental managers who wanted evidence that the new system was better than the 
existing one. On the other, there were also compelling reasons why Big Civic should simply 
accept and accommodate inappropriate aspects rather than rewrite the code each time. If the 
module was to be localised too much then there was the risk that the University would be unable 
to make use of later upgrades and new functionality released to the worldwide Campus user 
community (one of the primary reasons why an ERP system was acquired in the first place). In 
the case of the accounting records, therefore, these were simply stored on the system as they 
were generated - a fix that ultimately reduces the efficiency of the system and goals of reducing 
data redundancy. Within Big Civic, deciding whether to localise the module or maintain it as a 
global product was always a point of tension - a problem that has become known as the ‘package 
paradox’42. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Organisations are increasingly reliant on the use of packaged software solutions because of the 
economic benefits of commodified solutions, the interoperatibility benefits of standard platforms 
and the desire to align with best practice. However, there is often a large gulf between 
standardised generic solutions and the specific contexts, practices and requirements of particular 
user organisations. While there is a growing focus on the incommensurabilities between 
technology and organisation, much of this research is limited (focusing only on single aspects of 
the package lifecycle) and simplistic (emphasising either the ‘global’ or ‘local’ aspects of the 
package). Our argument has been that we need better mechanisms for understanding the coupling 
between technical and institutional change. This is in terms of the implications of software 
evolution for organisational change; by this, we mean the various characteristics a package 
accumulates through previous stages of design and the process by which its history or 
 19
‘biography’ continues to shape later adopting organisations. We also need to understand the 
influence of existing organisational practices on software design; here we intend the factors that 
mediate an organisation’s ability to shape and domesticate software and how their demands can 
come to influence the evolution of the package itself. 
In the article we have highlighted a number of stages that occurred in the biography of this ERP 
package. In the first, we described how incommensurabilities between the package and the 
setting were highlighted. Indeed, reconciling the package with the context of universities 
provided for an acute problem. There are fuzzy boundaries between universities and 
organisations more generally; while they engage in many similar activities they are arguably 
‘different’43.  It is difficult, for instance, to translate software to a new setting when packages 
embody conflicting categories and institutions have good reasons for continuing to use their own 
rather than accepting the generic classifications embodied in the software44. This makes the use 
of standard software all the more difficult. The depiction of students as special types of 
employees and the subsequent tensions this provoked suggests that this is far from a trivial 
problem and not one that will go away. Standard software is unable to support the diversity of 
classifications at use in a particular site and therefore some form of standardisation or 
convergence with the package is inevitable.  
The second stage we described was the actual means by which the module was translated for use 
in Big Civic and how both the software and the institution had to be created, but each depended 
on the other and this represented something of a ‘bootstrapping problem’. Indeed, this was a 
familiar theme among many of the other institutions involved in the project. It is one of the 
reasons why the Supplier ran into difficulties when attempting to move the module from a 
generic to a specific university user (‘they don’t have a model of the university to work with’). 
Similarly, in the third stage, when attempting to fit the module to the demands of all the pilots, 
they found themselves flooded by requests (‘lots of people from around the world asking for 
different things…they can’t decide on what is important’). Here the Supplier is forced to make a 
choice between the advantages of increasing a package’s scope and specificity (its greater utility 
and fit to the user organisations) and the cost advantages of increasing its market size. Increasing 
the range of functions within Campus gives benefits and potential value to the users. However, 
embodying evermore local knowledge and presumptions about organisational practices within 
the software will have implications for its applicability and fit in other organisational settings. 
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Therefore, they begin a fourth stage, the process of developing the system for a generic 
university user (i.e., the production of generalisable concepts). This stage was particularly 
interesting as it involved a process of genericification as the supplier attempted to replace 
idiosyncratic features with ‘common’ ones, what Schumm & Kocyba refer to as a process of 
‘decontextualisation’ and ‘recontextualisation’45. While this had initially worked well, this 
genericification process was beginning to be too resource consuming and we saw the fifth and 
final stage, where the module moved towards one particular design (that of Large Campus). This 
led to strains on the relationships between the supplier and Big Civic, who had agreed to pilot 
new software predicated on the belief that they could influence the shaping of the package in 
some way through allowing the software to be designed around their particular institution. Once 
the Suppliers attempted to make the module more generic, however, they experienced a ‘loss of 
control’ as their specific features were ‘designed out’ out of the system. 
In summary, what we have presented here is a first reflection on the biography of software 
packages and on the various tensions and complexities that surround the design, use and 
evolution of software packages. More comparative studies are needed of: 1) the strategies and 
decision making processes of those adopting software packages and how they assess and make 
sense of the wide range of alternatives and options available, both before and during 
implementation (and in later decisions about whether to procure further modules); 2) how 
suppliers make strategies and take decisions about product design and markets and how these 
influence the uptake and eventual fit of a package; and 3) how suppliers manage the tension 
between designing system for a specific user and for a wider market.  
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